DOI link to open access article:
A regulatory arbitrage game: Off-balance-sheet leverage and financial fragility
Dimitris Voliotis
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
Volume 7, issue 1, pages 131-150 (December 2022)
doi: 10.22574/jmid.2022.12.005
This study examines a simple banking system in a game-theoretic framework wherein banks act as self-interested agents to maximize leverage at the expense of overall financial stability. The resultant strategic inefficiency raises concerns about how banks manage the "financial stability" good, which is appropriated into a "tragedy of the commons." We conceptualize the inefficiency using the price of anarchy introduced by Koutsoupias & Papadimitriou (2009). We seek the optimal regulatory framework that minimizes the price of anarchy or the degree of financial fragility.
Keywords: Financial fragility, congestion games, price of anarchy, best response potential.
JEL Classification Numbers: G21, G28, D53, C72.