The Programme of the 10th Bi-Annual Conference on Economic Design

York, UK, June 14 (Wed)—16 (Fri), 2017

All plenary lectures and all parallel sessions will be held at the Law and Management Building (LMB) and its adjacent ones, Campus East, University of York, York, UK (a map and a booklet are attached). Participants can register and collect brochure and badge at the Conference Reception, LMB, between 3pm and 6pm, June 13 (Tues), 2017. Lecture rooms are given in the printed brochures. This programme has tried to accommodate all requests from those who told us they may have certain time constraint. It will, however, not be possible to make any further change. We ask for your understanding and support.

In each parallel session, the last speaker should chair all but her/his own presentation, while the first speaker should chair the last speaker’s presentation.

If you spot anything missing or wrong, please inform us at CED.Enquiry2017@gmail.com.

Keynote Addresses

Day 1: June 14 (Wed), 2017; 14:30—15:30

Paul Kleindorfer Lecture

Sanjeev Goyal (University of Cambridge)

Title: Integration and Segregation

Day 2: June 15 (Thu), 2017; 14:30—15:30

Leo Hurwicz Lecture

Philip Reny (University of Chicago)

Title: Sequential Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions

Day 3: June 16 (Fri), 2017; 14:30—15:30

Murat Sertel Lecture

Parag Pathak (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Title: Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans’ OneApp
Day 1

Parallel Sessions 1 (June 14, 2017; 09:00-11:00)

Auction 1

Nicolas Fugger, University of Mannheim. Exploiting Uncertainty about the Number of Competitors in Procurement Auctions.

Philippe Gillen, University of Cologne. Preferences and Decision Support in Competitive Bidding.

Olga Gorelkina, University of Liverpool. Precluding Collusion in the Vickrey Auction.

Oleg Baranov, University of Colorado at Boulder. Efficient Dynamic Auction for Private Valuations

Matching 1


Dinko Dimitrov, Saarland University. Gender Consistent Resolving Rules in Marriage Problems.

Voting and Elections 1

Swarndenu Chatterjee, Maastricht University. Frequency Based Analysis of Voting Rules.


Yoko Kawada, Keio University. Consistent Representation and Electoral Systems.

Contests

Toomas Hinnosaar, Collegio Carlo Alberto. Dynamic Common-Value Contests.


Marco Serena, Universidad Carlos III and Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance. Sequential Contests Revisited.


Cooperation and Coalitional Behaviour 1

Francisco Llerena Garrés, Rovira i Virgili University. Consistency Distinguishes the (Weighted) Shapley Value, the (Weighted) Surplus Division Solution and the Prenucleolus, co-authored by Pedro Calleja, Universitat de Barcelona.

Chih-Chun Yang, Academia Sinica (Taipei). Subjective Coalition-Proof Equilibrium.

Anna Khmelnitskaya, Saint-Petersburg State University. Centrality Rewarding Shapley and Myerson Values for Undirected Graph Games.

Walter Trockel, Istanbul Bilgi University and Bielefeld University. Competitive Payoffs in Coalitional Games.

Bargaining 1

Deepal Basak, Indian School of Business. Transparency and Delay in Bargaining.

Simon Hoof, Paderborn University. The Recursive Bargaining Solution for NTU Differential Games.

Chiu Yu Ko, National University of Singapore. Decentralized One-to-Many Bargaining.

**Parallel Sessions 2 (June 14, 2017; 11:30-13:30)**

**Auction 2**

Cedric Wasser, University of Bonn. Optimal Favouritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests.

Alex Suzdaltsev, Stanford University. Distributionally Robust Pricing in Auctions.


Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong, University of Bristol. On the Core of Auctions with Externalities: Stability and Fairness.

**Matching 2**


Shashwat Khare, Maastricht University. Stability in Matching with Couples Having Non-Responsive Preferences.

Irene Yuan Lo, Columbia University. Information Acquisition Costs of Matching Markets.

Vincent Iehle, Universite Paris-Dauphine. Timely Matching.

**Refugee Assignment and Diversity**


Alex Teytelboym, University of Oxford. Refugee Resettlement, co-authored by David Delacretaz, University of Melbourne.
Chia-Ling Hsu, Kyushu University. Promoting Diversity of Talents: A Market Design Approach.


Growth and Development

Rong Zhang, Chongqing University. A Growth Model with Welfare Effect, co-authored by Zaifu Yang, University of York.

Agnieszka Lipieta, Cracow University of Economics. Schumpeterian Evolution as the Composition of Adjustment Processes, co-authored by Artur Lipieta, Cracow University of Economics.


Sayantan Ghosh Dastidar, University of Derby. Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth in Developing Countries: The Role of Openness.

Networks and Matching

Benjamin Sperisen, Tulane University. Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game.

Spiros Bougheas, University of Nottingham. Contagion in Stable Networks

Sonal Yadav, University of Padua. Matching with Homophily

Jean-Jacques Herings, Maastricht University. An Axiomatization of the Proportional Rule in Financial Networks.

Information, Communication, Disclosure 1

Matthias Dahm, University of Nottingham. The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules.

Stefan Terstiege, Maastricht University. Disclosure Regulation.

Sergey Stepanov, National Research University Higher School of Economics. Reputation Concerns and Information Aggregation.
Yangbo Song, The Chinese University of Hong Kong at Shenzhen. Dynamic R&D Competition under Uncertainty and Strategic Disclosure.

Parallel Sessions 3 (June 14, 2017; 16:00-18:00)

Trading Processes and Markets 1


Jordi Massó, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility of Truth-telling in Stable Mechanisms in Monotonic Matching Markets.

Implementation
Michele Lombardi, University of Glasgow. Sequential Implementation without Commitment.

Boaz Zik, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Implementation with Interdependent Payoffs.

Ritesh Jain, Ohio State University. Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences.


Information, Communication, Disclosure 2
Qinggong Wu, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Coarse Communication and Institution Design.

Avi Lichtig, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Enemy of My Enemy is (Better than) My Friend.

Angel Hernando-Veciana, Universidad Carlos III. Cheap Talk and Strategic Rounding in LIBOR Submissions.

Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 1

Inácio Bó, Berlin Social Science Centre. Consistent Hiring by Rankings and Rules.


Jens Gudmundsson, University of Copenhagen. Ranking Individuals on the Basis of Collaborations.


Division and Provision Rules

Katharina Huesmann, University of Cologne. Public Provision of Scarce Resources when Preferences Are Non-Linear.

Ryusuke Shinohara, Hosei University. Self-Representation Equilibria and Cost-Matching Grants with the Lindahl Price in Interregional Bargaining over Public Projects

María Gómez-Rúa, Universidade de Vigo. A New Solution for Allocating the Costs of Cleaning a River: Fairness versus Incentive Compatibility.

Min-hung Tsay and Chun-Hsien Yeh, National Chung Cheng University and Academia Sinica at Taipei. Relations among the Central Rules in Bankruptcy Problems: a Strategic Justification Perspective.

Domain Restrictions

Peng Liu, Singapore Management University. Strategy-Proofness of the Probabilistic Serial Rule on Sequentially Dichotomous Domains.


Anup Pramanik, Osaka University. On Strategy-Proof Social Choice between Two Alternatives.
Day 2

Parallel Sessions 4 (June 15, 2017; 09:00-11:00)

Auctions 3


Helene Mass, University of Cologne. Endogenous Worst-Case Beliefs in First-Price Auctions.

Noriaki Okamoto, Keio University. An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment.

Ella Segev, Ben Gurion University of the Negev. Heterogeneous Risk/Loss Aversion in Complete Information All-pay Auctions.

Bargaining 2

Xu Lang, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics. Characterization of The Minimal Norm Solution in Bargaining with Incomplete Information.

Soumendu Sarkar, TERI University. Bargaining for Land Acquisition: Competition and Contiguity.


Shiran Rachmilevitch, University of Haifa, Bargaining with Periodic Participation Costs.

Division, Claim and Related Problems

Ricardo Martinez, Universidad de Granada. The Problem of Dividing a Budget among Several Districts.

Anna Bogomolnaia, University of Glasgow. Competitive Division of a Mixed Manna.

Ryan Tierney, University of Montreal. Gale’s Flat Tax.

Trading Processes and Markets 2

Acelya Altuntas, University of Rochester. Trading Probabilities in Cycles.

Renaud Foucart, Humboldt University. Metasearch and Market Concentration.

Yuan Ju, University of York. The English Housing Market Mechanism.

Kim-Sau Chung, Chinese University of Hongkong. Selling to Consumers with Intransitive Indifference.

Information and Contracts 1


Menghan Xu, Xiamen University. Debt Contract with Limited Enforcement.

Colin Negenborn, Humboldt University. Lemons versus Collusion.


Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 2


Bo Chen, University of Warwick. Who Should Cast the Casting Vote? Using Sequential Voting to Amalgamate Information, co-authored by Steve Alpern, University of Warwick.

Ata Atay, University of Barcelona. Multi-Sided Assignment Games with m-Partite Graphs.


Parallel Sessions 5 (June 15, 2017; 11:30-13:30)
Voting and Elections 2

Jean Lainé, LIRSA-CNAM. Manipulation by Vote Pairing in Single-Winner Large Elections.

Dmitriy Vorobyev, Ural Federal University. Information Disclosure in Elections with Sequential Costly Participation.

Matias Nunez, Université Paris-Dauphine. Truth-Revealing Voting Rules for Large Populations.

Ming Li, Concordia University. Optimal Majority Rule in Referenda.

Organ Exchange and Related Topics


Yao Cheng, University of York. Efficient Kidney Exchange with Dichotomous Preferences.

Francisco Robles, University of Barcelona. Axioms for the Minimum Walrasian Equilibrium in Assignment Problems with Unitary Demands

Utku Unver, Boston College. Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Liver Exchange.

Trading Processes and Markets 3


Radoslav Raykov, Bank of Canada. Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two-Sided Markets with Weak Preferences.

Jinpeng Ma, Rutgers University. Convergence of Averaging Price Processes under the Centralized Walrasian Auction and the Decentralized Double Auction.

Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland. Market design and FCC incentive auction.

Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 3

Patrick Harless, University of Glasgow. Solidarity in Social Choice: A Robust Impossibility and a New Compromise Family.

Ville Korpela, Turku School of Economics. Social Choice Theory: A Neglected Path to Possibility.
Norihito Sakamoto, Tokyo University of Science. A Class of Equity Criteria Based on Dominance Principle and Individual Preferences: A New Concept of Economic Equity.

Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University. A Rawlsian Approach to the Queueing Problem.

**Allocation Rules and Auction**

Daniel Z. Li, Durham University. Optimal Sequential Search Auctions with a Deadline.

Abdul Quadir, Birla Institute of Technology and Science. Weak Envy-freeness for Equals in Multi-unit Auctions.

Shigehiro Serizawa, Osaka University. Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with no Wastage.


**Allocation and Assignment 1**

Peter Troyan, University of Virginia. Efficient and Essentially Stable Assignments.

Jingyi Xue, Singapore Management University. Equal Quantiles Rules in Resource Allocation with Uncertain Demands.

Kiyong Yun, Seoul National University. Characterizations of the Probabilistic Serial Rule for the Simple Random Assignment Problem.

Day 3

Parallel Sessions 6 (June 16, 2017; 09:00-11:00)

Teams and Organizations
Endre Csoka, Alfred Renyi Institute of Mathematics. Efficient Teamwork.
Krzysztof Szczygielski, University of Warsaw. Incentives in Self-Regulatory Organizations.
Paul Schweinzer, Alpen-Adria-Universitat. Optimal Team Composition and the Apollo Effect

Allocation and Assignment 2
Jinyong Jeong, Boston College. Parking Slot Assignment Problem.
Tomoya Kazumura, Osaka University. Equal Treatment of Equals and Strategy-Proofness in Object Allocation with Non-Quasilinear Preferences.
Mengling Li, Xiamen University. Pareto Efficient Assignments in the Generalized Roommates Problem.

Implementation and Mechanisms
Makoto Hagiwara, Tokyo Institute of Technology. Ex Post Implementation: A Full Characterization.
Lukas Block, University of Paderborn. Legislation Effects on Lobby Group Formation.
Tilman Borgers, University of Michigan. Simple Mechanisms.
Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 4

Andrea Gallice, Università di Torino. Cooperation in Social Dilemmas through Position Uncertainty

Justin Kruger, Université Paris-Dauphine. Restricting the Domain Allows for Weaker Independence.

Laura Kasper, Saarland and Maastricht University. On Condorcet Consistency and Two Instances of Participation Failure.


Cooperation and Coalitional Behaviour 2


Mert Kimya, Koc University. Equilibrium Coalitional Behavior.

Seckin Ozbeklen, Istanbul Bilgi University. Strong Exchange Stability in Hedonic Games.

Elena Molis, University of Granada. Random Paths to Stability in Hedonic Games.

School Choice and Assignment 1


Lucien Frys, Humboldt University. University Entrance Test and High Schools Segregation.

Nadja Maraun, University of Paderborn. Boston School Choice Mechanism and Deferred Acceptance Algorithm with Priorities Depending on Students’ Preferences.

Martin Van der Linden, Vanderbilt University. Manipulability and Tie-Breaking in Constrained School Choice.
Parallel Sessions 7 (June 16, 2017; 11:30-13:30)

Allocation and Assignment 3

Marina Nunez Oliver, University of Barcelona. The Dual Assignment Game, Rational Allocation and Exactness.

Ryosuke Sakai, Osaka University. Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency in Assignment Problem with Discrete Payments.

Josue Alberto Ortega Sandoval, University of Glasgow. Fair Assignments for Generalized Tennis Problems.

Madhav Raghavan, University of Lausanne. Efficient Pairwise Allocation via Partner Trading.

Experiments and Empirics 1

Angelika Endres, Paderborn University. Network Formation and Disruption – An Experiment: Are Efficient Networks too Complex?

Siqi Song, University of York. Evidence of Herding Behaviour on eBay Inventory Listing

Rustamdjan Hakimov, Berlin Social Science Centre. Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence

Maria Montero, University of Nottingham. Communication with Partially Verifiable Information: An Experiment

School Choice and Assignment 2

Christian Basteck, Université Libre de Bruxelles and F.R.S. Cognitive Ability and Games of School Choice.

Fatma Aslan, Istanbul Bilgi University. Job Mobility of Couples when Distance Matters.


Coordination, Timing and Investment

Huanhuan Zheng, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Coordinated Trading and Market Efficiency.
Chun-Ting Chen, National Taiwan University. Coordination in Social Networks: Communication by Actions.
Tomomi Miyazaki, Kobe University. Public Investment and Stock Prices: The Case of Japan.

College, School Admission and Related Topics

Eun Jeong Heo, Vanderbilt University. Financial Aids in College Admissions: Need-Based versus Merit-Based.
Mustafa Oguz Afacan, Sabanci University. Graduate Admission with Financial Support.
Josep Izquierdo, Universitat de Barcelona. Core Incentives Properties in Joint Investment Problems.
Lars Ehlers, Universite de Montreal. (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice.

Rules and Mechanisms

Yuta Nakamura, Keio University. Dispute Mediation Mechanisms.
İpek Özkal Sanver, Istanbul Bilgi University. Compromise Rules Revisited.
Justus Winkelmann, University of Bonn. A Ranking Mechanism for Coupled Binary Decision Problems.
Bettina Klaus, University of Lausanne. A Characterization of Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices.

Parallel Sessions 8 (June 16, 2017; 16:00-18:00)

Information and Contracts 2

Alexandros Rigos, Lund University. A Beauty Contest with Flexible Information Acquisition.
Thomas Schacherer, Humboldt-University. Long-Term Contracting with Unequal Discounting.

Xinyi Xu, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Existence of Optimal Deterministic Contracts in Moral Hazard Problems.

Karol Flores-Szwagrzak, University of Southern Demark. Co-Authorship and the Measurement of Individual Productivity.

**Experiments and Empirics 2**

Oktay Sürücü, Bielefeld University. Asymmetric Dominance Effect with Multiple Decoys.


Karl Robert Jandoc, University of the Philippines-Diliman. An Experimental Study of Self-Enforcing Coalitions.

Alex Possajennikov, University of Nottingham. The Choice of Voting Rules under a Veil of Ignorance: Experimental Evidence.

**Trading Processes and Markets 4**

Vincent Meisner, Technical University Berlin. Competing for Strategic Buyers.

Dimitris Voliotis, University of Piraeus. The Dark Side of Trading. A Strategic Model.

Bernhard Kasberger, University of Vienna. Welfare in the Auction After-Market.

**Contest, Implementation and Identification**

Wonki Jo Cho, Korea University. Identifying Groups in a Boolean Algebra.

Zhewei Wang, Shandong University. Optimal Multi-Dimensional Rank-Order Contest.

Mehmet Barlo, Sabanci University. Behavioural Implementation under Incomplete Information.
Choice, Contract and Matching

Li Chen, University of Gothenburg. Time-Constrained School Choice.

Rongzhu Ke, Chinese University of Hong Kong. A General Solution Method for Moral Hazard Problem.

Sean Horan, University of Montreal. How to ”Reveal” Hidden Substitutes.