2017 CONFERENCE ON ECONOMI DESIGN PROGRAMME

THE UNIVERSITY OF YORK
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Instruction and Advice

- All keynote addresses and all parallel sessions will be held at the Law and Management Building (LMB), Campus East, University of York.
- In each parallel session, the last speaker should chair all but her/his own presentation, while the first speaker should chair the last speaker’s presentation. Each presentation is 30 minutes long and should be strictly observed.
- For your presentation, you need to upload your PDF or PPT file to the local system and cannot use your own laptop for presentation.
- In all lecture rooms, no food or drinking except water is allowed.
- During lunch, tea and coffee, the welcome reception and the gala dinner time, every participant is kindly requested to wear the conference badge.
- There are frequent buses such as Nos 56 and 66 from the city centre and railway station to the University of York campus (West and East) during the day. It is about 3.1 miles between York Railway Station and Campus East and takes 20 minutes by bus and 70 minutes by walking.
- You should keep your belongings at a safe place and be vigilant on any suspicious person or object.
- If you are allergic to certain food or drinking, you should take all reasonable precautions to protect yourself.
Lunches and Social Events

- Lunches (13:30—14:30), tea, coffee and biscuits (11:00—11:30, 15:30—16:00) will be provided at the Atrium, LMB, June 14-16, 2017.

- The welcome reception (18:15—19:00) and the gala dinner (19:00-21:00) will be held at the Principal York Hotel, Thu 15\textsuperscript{th} June 2017. The hotel is next to York Railway Station. You could arrive there by yourself by bus or on foot.

- You will be given a gala dinner table number when you receive this brochure. You are kindly requested to find your place (name) card on your assigned dinner table.

- The tickets for visiting York Minster can be repeatedly used for one year starting from 9\textsuperscript{th} June 2017 when they are issued.
Programme Overview

**Day 1: Wed 14\textsuperscript{th} June 2017**

1 Parallel Sessions 09:00-11:00
2 Parallel Sessions 11:30-13:30
**Keynote Address** 14:30-15:30
3 Parallel Sessions 16:00-18:00

**Day 2: Thu 15\textsuperscript{th} June 2017**

4 Parallel Sessions 09:00-11:00
5 Parallel Sessions 11:30-13:30
**Keynote Address** 14:30-15:30
Gala Dinner 19:00-21:00

**Day 3: Fri 16\textsuperscript{th} June, 2017**

6 Parallel Sessions 09:00-11:00
7 Parallel Sessions 11:30-13:30
**Keynote Address** 14:30-15:30
8 Parallel Sessions 16:00-18:00
Keynote Addresses

Wed 14th Jun 2017; 14:30—15:30  Place: LMB/30X
Paul Kleindorfer Lecture
Sanjeev Goyal (University of Cambridge)
Title: The Strategy of Conquest
Chair: Lars Ehlers, Universite de Montreal

Thu 15th Jun 2017; 14:30—15:30  Place: LMB/30X
Leo Hurwicz Lecture
Philip Reny (University of Chicago)
Title: Sequential Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions
Chair: Zaifu Yang, University of York

Fri 16th Jun 2017; 14:30—15:30  Place: LMB/30X
Murat Sertel Lecture
Parag Pathak (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Title: Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp
Chair: Utku Ünver, Boston College
# Parallel Session Overview: Day 1

### Parallel Sessions 1 (09:00-11:00, Wed 14\textsuperscript{th} Jun 2017)

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<th>Auction 1, LMB/030</th>
<th>Matching 1, LMB/2XA</th>
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<td>Voting and Election 1, LMB/031</td>
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<td>Cooperation and Coalitional Behaviour 1, LMB/37X</td>
<td>Bargaining 1, LMB/2XB</td>
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### Parallel Sessions 2 (11:30-13:30, Wed 14\textsuperscript{th} Jun 2017)

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<td>Refugee Assignment and Diversity, LMB/36X</td>
<td>Growth and Development, LMB/37X</td>
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<td>Networks and Matching, LMB/38X</td>
<td>Information, Communication, Disclosure 1, LMB/008</td>
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### Parallel Sessions 3 (16:00-18:00, Wed 14\textsuperscript{th} Jun 2017)

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<td>Information, Communication, Disclosure 2, LMB/031</td>
<td>Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 1, LMB/37X</td>
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<td>Division and Provision Rules, LMB/2XA</td>
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**Parallel Session Overview: Day 2**

**Parallel Sessions 4 (09:00-11:00, Thu 15th Jun 2017)**

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**Parallel Sessions 5 (11:30-13:30, Thu 15th Jun 2017)**

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<th>Organ Exchange and Related Topics, LMB/36X</th>
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<td>Trading Processes and Markets 3, LMB/37X</td>
<td>Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 3, LMB/030</td>
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<td>Allocation Rules and Auction, LMB/031</td>
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**Parallel Session Overview: Day 3**

**Parallel Sessions 6 (09:00-11:00, Fri 16th Jun 2017)**

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<td>Cooperation and Coalitional Behaviour 2, LMB/2XA</td>
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**Parallel Sessions 7 (11:30-13:30, Fri 16th Jun 2017)**

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<tr>
<td>School Choice and Assignment 2, LMB/030</td>
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**Parallel Sessions 8 (16:00-18:00, Fri 16th Jun 2017)**

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<th>Contest, Implementation and Identification, LMB/36X</th>
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<tr>
<td>Experiments and Empirics 2, LMB/030</td>
<td>Choice, Contract and Matching, LMB/37X</td>
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<td>Trading Processes and Markets 4, LMB/031</td>
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Parallel Sessions 1 (09:00-11:00, Jun 14)  Day 1

Auction 1
Nicolas Fugger, Centre for European Economic Research. Exploiting Uncertainty about the Number of Competitors in Procurement Auctions.
Philippe Gillen, University of Cologne. Preferences and Decision Support in Competitive Bidding.
Olga Gorelkina, University of Liverpool. Precluding Collusion in the Vickrey Auction.
Oleg Baranov, University of Colorado at Boulder. Efficient Dynamic Auction for Private Valuations

Matching 1
Dinko Dimitrov, Saarland University. Gender Consistent Resolving Rules in Marriage Problems.

Voting and Elections 1
Swarndenu Chatterjee, Maastricht University. Frequency Based Analysis of Voting Rules.
Yoko Kawada, Keio University. Consistent Representation and Electoral Systems.
Contests LMB/36X
Toomas Hinnosaar, Collegio Carlo Alberto. Dynamic Common-Value Contests.
Marco Serena, Universidad Carlos III and Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance. Sequential Contests Revisited.

Cooperation and Coalitional Behaviour 1 LMB/37X
Francisco Llerena Garrés, Rovira i Virgili University. Consistency Distinguishes the (Weighted) Shapley Value, the (Weighted) Surplus Division Solution and the Prenucleolus, co-authored by Pedro Calleja, Universitat de Barcelona.
Chih-Chun Yang, Academia Sinica (Taipei). Subjective Coalition-Proof Equilibrium.
Anna Khmelnitzkaya, Saint-Petersburg State University. Centrality Rewarding Shapley and Myerson Values for Undirected Graph Games.
Walter Trockel, Istanbul Bilgi University and Bielefeld University. Competitive Payoffs in Coalitional Games.

Bargaining 1 LMB/2XB
Deepal Basak, Indian School of Business. Transparency and Delay in Bargaining.
Simon Hoof, Paderborn University. The Recursive Bargaining Solution for NTU Differential Games.
Chiu Yu Ko, National University of Singapore. Decentralized One-to-Many Bargaining.
Parallel Sessions 2 (11:30-13:30, Jun 14)  Day 1

Auction 2  
LMB/030
Cedric Wasser, University of Bonn. Optimal Favouritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests.
Alex Suzdaltsev, Stanford University. Distributionally Robust Pricing in Auctions.
Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong, University of Bristol. On the Core of Auctions with Externalities: Stability and Fairness.

Matching 2  
LMB/031
Shashwat Khare, Maastricht University. Stability in Matching with Couples Having Non-Responsive Preferences.
Irene Yuan Lo, Columbia University. Information Acquisition Costs of Matching Markets.
Vincent Iehle, Universite Paris-Dauphine. Timely Matching.

Refugee Assignment and Diversity  
LMB/36X
Alex Teytelboym, University of Oxford. Refugee Resettlement, co-authored by David Delacretaz, University of Melbourne.
Chia-Ling Hsu, Kyushu University. Promoting Diversity of Talents: A Market Design Approach.
Growth and Development
Rong Zhang, Chongqing University. A Growth Model with Welfare Effect, co-authored by Zaifu Yang, University of York.
Agnieszka Lipieta, Cracow University of Economics. Schumpeterian Evolution as the Composition of Adjustment Processes, co-authored by Artur Lipieta, Cracow University of Economics.
Sayantan Ghosh Dastidar, University of Derby. Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth in Developing Countries: The Role of Openness.

Networks and Matching
Benjamin Sperisen, Tulane University. Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game.
Spiros Bougheas, University of Nottingham. Contagion in Stable Networks
Sonal Yadav, University of Padua. Matching with Homophily
Jean-Jacques Herings, Maastricht University. An Axiomatization of the Proportional Rule in Financial Networks.

Information, Communication, Disclosure 1
Matthias Dahm, University of Nottingham. The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules.
Stefan Terstiege, Maastricht University. Disclosure Regulation.
Sergey Stepanov, National Research University Higher School of Economics. Reputation Concerns and Information Aggregation.
Yangbo Song, The Chinese University of Hong Kong at Shenzhen. Dynamic R&D Competition under Uncertainty and Strategic Disclosure
Parallel Sessions 3 (16:00-18:00, Jun 14)  Day 1

Trading Processes and Markets 1  LMB/030
Jordi Massó, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility of Truth-telling in Stable Mechanisms in Monotonic Matching Markets.

Implementation  LMB/36X
Michele Lombardi, University of Glasgow. Sequential Implementation without Commitment.
Boaz Zik, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Implementation with Interdependent Payoffs.
Ritesh Jain, Ohio State University. Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences.

Information, Communication, Disclosure 2  LMB/031
Qinggong Wu, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Coarse Communication and Institution Design.
Avi Lichtig, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Enemy of My Enemy is (Better than) My Friend.
Angel Hernando-Veciana, Universidad Carlos III. Cheap Talk and Strategic Rounding in LIBOR Submissions.
16:00-18:00, Jun 14

Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 1

Inácio Bó, Berlin Social Science Centre. Consistent Hiring by Rankings and Rules.
Jens Gudmundsson, University of Copenhagen. Ranking Individuals on the Basis of Collaborations.

Division and Provision Rules

Katharina Huesmann, University of Cologne. Public Provision of Scarce Resources when Preferences Are Non-Linear.
Ryusuke Shinohara, Hosei University. Self-Representation Equilibria and Cost-Matching Grants with the Lindahl Price in Interregional Bargaining over Public Projects
Maria Gómez-Rúa, Universidade de Vigo. A New Solution for Allocating the Costs of Cleaning a River: Fairness versus Incentive Compatibility.
Min-hung Tsay and Chun-Hsien Yeh, National Chung Cheng University and Academia Sinica at Taipei. Relations among the Central Rules in Bankruptcy Problems: A Strategic Justification Perspective.

Domain Restrictions

Peng Liu, Singapore Management University. Strategy-Proofness of the Probabilistic Serial Rule on Sequentially Dichotomous Domains.
Anup Pramanik, Osaka University. On Strategy-Proof Social Choice between Two Alternatives.
09:00-11:00, Jun 15

Parallel Sessions 4 (09:00-11:00, Jun 15)  Day 2

Auctions 3  LMB/030
Helene Mass, University of Cologne. Endogenous Worst-Case Beliefs in First-Price Auctions.
Noriaki Okamoto, Keio University. An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comments.
Ella Segev, Ben Gurion University of the Negev. Heterogeneous Risk/Loss Aversion in Complete Information All-pay Auctions.

Bargaining 2  LMB/031
Xu Lang, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics. Characterization of The Minimal Norm Solution in Bargaining with Incomplete Information.
Soumendu Sarkar, TERI University. Bargaining for Land Acquisition: Competition and Contiguity.
Shiran Rachmilevitch, University of Haifa. Bargaining with Periodic Participation Costs.

Division, Claim and Related Problems  LMB/36X
Ricardo Martinez, Universidad de Granada. The Problem of Dividing a Budget among Several Districts.
Anna Bogomolnaia, University of Glasgow. Competitive Division of a Mixed Manna.
Ryan Tierney, University of Montreal. Gale’s Flat Tax.
09:00-11:00, Jun 15

**Trading Processes and Markets 2**  
LMB/37X  
Acelya Altuntas, University of Rochester. Trading Probabilities in Cycles.  
Renaud Foucart, Humboldt University. Metasearch and Market Concentration.  
Yuan Ju, University of York. The English Housing Market Mechanism.  
Kim-Sau Chung, Chinese University of Hongkong. Selling to Consumers with Intransitive Indifference.

**Information and Contracts 1**  
LMB/2XA  
Menghan Xu, Xiamen University. Debt Contract with Limited Enforcement.  
Colin Negenborn, Humboldt University. Lemons versus Collusion.  

**Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 2**  
LMB/2XB  
Bo Chen, University of Warwick. Who Should Cast the Casting Vote? Using Sequential Voting to Amalgamate Information, co-authored by Steve Alpern, University of Warwick.  
Ata Atay, University of Barcelona. Multi-Sided Assignment Games with m-Partite Graphs.  
11:30-13:30, Jun 15

Parallel Sessions 5 (11:30-13:30, Jun 15)  Day 2

Voting and Elections 2  LMB/2XA
Jean Lainé, LIRSA-CNAM. Manipulation by Vote Pairing in Single-Winner Large Elections.
Dmitriy Vorobyev, Ural Federal University. Information Disclosure in Elections with Sequential Costly Participation.
Ming Li, Concordia University. Optimal Majority Rule in Referenda.

Organ Exchange and Related Topics  LMB/36X
Yao Cheng, University of York. Efficient Kidney Exchange with Dichotomous Preferences.
Francisco Robles, University of Barcelona. Axioms for the Minimum Walrasian Equilibrium in Assignment Problems with Unitary Demands.
Utku Unver, Boston College. Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Liver Exchange.

Trading Processes and Markets 3  LMB/37X
Radoslav Raykov, Bank of Canada. Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two-Sided Markets with Weak Preferences.
Jinpeng Ma, Rutgers University. Convergence of Averaging Price Processes under the Centralized Walrasian Auction and the Decentralized Double Auction.
Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland. Market design and FCC incentive auction.
11:30-13:30, Jun 15

**Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 3**

Patrick Harless, University of Glasgow. Solidarity in Social Choice: A Robust Impossibility and a New Compromise Family.
Ville Korpela, Turku School of Economics. Social Choice Theory: A Neglected Path to Possibility.
Norihito Sakamoto, Tokyo University of Science. A Class of Equity Criteria Based on Dominance Principle and Individual Preferences: A New Concept of Economic Equity.
Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University. A Rawlsian Approach to the Queueing Problem.

**Allocation Rules and Auction**

Daniel Z. Li, Durham University. Optimal Sequential Search Auctions with a Deadline.
Abdul Quadir, Birla Institute of Technology and Science. Weak Envy-freeness for Equals in Multi-Unit Auctions.
Shigehiro Serizawa, Osaka University. Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with no Wastage.

**Allocation and Assignment 1**

Peter Troyan, University of Virginia. Efficient and Essentially Stable Assignments.
Jingyi Xue, Singapore Management University. Equal Quantiles Rules in Resource Allocation with Uncertain Demands.
Kiyong Yun, Seoul National University. Characterizations of the Probabilistic Serial Rule for the Simple Random Assignment Problem.
09:00-11:00, Jun 16

**Parallel Sessions 6 (09:00-11:00, Jun 16)**

**Day 3**

**Teams and Organizations**

Endre Csoka, Afred Renyi Institute of Mathematics. Efficient Teamwork.
Krzysztof Szczygielski, University of Warsaw. Incentives in Self-Regulatory Organizations.
Paul Schweinzer, Alpen-Adria-Universitat. Optimal Team Composition and the Apollo Effect

**Allocation and Assignment 2**

Jinyong Jeong, Boston College. Parking Slot Assignment Problem.
Tomoya Kazumura, Osaka University. Equal Treatment of Equals and Strategy-Proofness in Object Allocation with Non-Quasilinear Preferences.
Mengling Li, Xiamen University. Pareto Efficient Assignments in the Generalized Roommates Problem.

**Implementation and Mechanisms**

Makoto Hagiwara, Tokyo Institute of Technology. Ex Post Implementation: A Full Characterization.
Lukas Block, University of Paderborn. Legislation Effects on Lobby Group Formation.
Tilman Borgers, University of Michigan. Simple Mechanisms.
09:00-11:00, Jun 16

**Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 4**

Andrea Gallice, Università di Torino. Cooperation in Social Dilemmas through Position Uncertainty

Justin Kruger, Université Paris-Dauphine. Restricting the Domain Allows for Weaker Independence.

Laura Kasper, Saarland and Maastricht University. On Condorcet Consistency and Two Instances of Participation Failure.


**Cooperation and Coalitional Behaviour 2**


Mert Kimya, Koc University. Equilibrium Coalitional Behavior.

Seckin Ozbilen, Istanbul Bilgi University. Strong Exchange Stability in Hedonic Games.

Elena Molis, University of Granada. Random Paths to Stability in Hedonic Games.

**School Choice and Assignment 1**


Lucien Frys, Humboldt University. University Entrance Test and High Schools Segregation.

Nadja Maraun, University of Paderborn. Boston School Choice Mechanism and Deferred Acceptance Algorithm with Priorities Depending on Students’ Preferences.

Martin Van der Linden, Vanderbilt University. Manipulability and Tie-Breaking in Constrained School Choice.
Parallel Sessions 7 (11:30-13:30, Jun 16)  Day 3

Allocation and Assignment 3  LMB/2XA
Marina Nunez Oliver, University of Barcelona. The Dual Assignment Game, Rational Allocation and Exactness.
Ryosuke Sakai, Osaka University. Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency in Assignment Problem with Discrete Payments.
Josue Alberto Ortega Sandoval, University of Glasgow. Fair Assignments for Generalized Tennis Problems.
Madhav Raghavan, University of Lausanne. Efficient Pairwise Allocation via Partner Trading.

Experiments and Empirics 1  LMB/2XB
Angelika Endres, Paderborn University. Network Formation and Disruption – An Experiment: Are Efficient Networks too Complex?
Siqi Song, University of York. Evidence of Herding Behaviour on eBay Inventory Listing
Rustamdjan Hakimov, Berlin Social Science Centre. Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence
Maria Montero, University of Nottingham. Communication with Partially Verifiable Information: An Experiment

School Choice and Assignment 2  LMB/030
Christian Basteck, Université Libre de Bruxelles and F.R.S. Cognitive Ability and Games of School Choice.
Fatma Aslan, Istanbul Bilgi University. Job Mobility of Couples when Distance Matters.
11:30-13:30, Jun 16

**Coordination, Timing and Investment**

Huanhuan Zheng, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Coordinated Trading and Market Efficiency.
Chun-Ting Chen, National Taiwan University. Coordination in Social Networks: Communication by Actions.
Tomomi Miyazaki, Kobe University. Public Investment and Stock Prices: The Case of Japan.

**College, School Admission and Related Topics**

Eun Jeong Heo, Vanderbilt University. Financial Aids in College Admissions: Need-Based versus Merit-Based.
Mustafa Oguz Afacan, Sabanci University. Graduate Admission with Financial Support.
Josep Izquierdo, Universitat de Barcelona. Core Incentives Properties in Joint Investment Problems.
Lars Ehlers, Universite de Montreal. (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice.

**Rules and Mechanisms**

Yuta Nakamura, Keio University. Dispute Mediation Mechanisms.
İpek Özkal Sanver, Istanbul Bilgi University. Compromise Rules Revisited.
Justus Winkelmann, University of Bonn. A Ranking Mechanism for Coupled Binary Decision Problems.
Bettina Klaus, University of Lausanne. A Characterization of Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices.
Parallel Sessions 8 (16:00-18:00, Jun 16)  Day 3

Information and Contracts 2  LMB/2XA
Alexandros Rigos, Lund University. A Beauty Contest with Flexible Information Acquisition.
Thomas Schacherer, Humboldt-University. Long-Term Contracting with Unequal Discounting.
Xinyi Xu, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Existence of Optimal Deterministic Contracts in Moral Hazard Problems.
Karol Flores-Szwagrzak, University of Southern Demark. Co-Authorship and the Measurement of Individual Productivity.

Experiments and Empirics 2  LMB/030
Oktay Sürücü, Bielefeld University. Asymmetric Dominance Effect with Multiple Decoys.
Karl Robert Jandoc, University of the Philippines-Diliman. An Experimental Study of Self-Enforcing Coalitions.
Alex Possajennikov, University of Nottingham. The Choice of Voting Rules under a Veil of Ignorance: Experimental Evidence.

Trading Processes and Markets 4  LMB/031
Vincent Meisner, Technical University Berlin. Competing for Strategic Buyers.
Dimitris Voliotis, University of Piraeus. The Dark Side of Trading: A Strategic Model.
Bernhard Kasberger, University of Vienna. Welfare in the Auction After-Market.
16:00-18:00, Jun 16

**Contest, Implementation and Identification**

LMB/36X

Wonki Jo Cho, Korea University. Identifying Groups in a Boolean Algebra.

Zhewei Wang, Shandao University. Optimal Multi-Dimensional Rank-Order Contest.

Mehmet Barlo, Sabanci University. Behavioural Implementation under Incomplete Information.

**Choice, Contract and Matching**

LMB/37X

Li Chen, University of Gothenburg. Time-Constrained School Choice.

Rongzhu Ke, Chinese University of Hong Kong. A General Solution Method for Moral Hazard Problem.

Sean Horan, University of Montreal. How to ``Reveal” Hidden Substitutes.
Emergency Calls

- **999** is the official emergency number in the UK. You should call this number, when there is danger to life or when violence is being used or threatened.

- **101** is the number to call when you want to contact local police – when it’s less urgent than a 999 call.

- For other non-emergency matters, please contact at ced.enquiry2017@gmail.com.
Acknowledgements

We gratefully acknowledge all financial and administrative support from the Department of Economics and Centre for Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York. We wish to thank Jo Swaffield for her never-failing support, Vin McDermott for his generous help, and Annette Johnson for her excellent assistance.